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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="SPA-based SAVNET">Source Prefix Advertisement for Intra-domain SAVNET</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-li-savnet-source-prefix-advertisement-01"/>
    <author initials="D." surname="Li" fullname="Dan Li">
      <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="N." surname="Geng" fullname="Nan Geng">
      <organization>Huawei</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>gengnan@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="L." surname="Qin" fullname="Lancheng Qin">
      <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>qinlc@mail.zgclab.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="October" day="20"/>
    <area>Routing</area>
    <workgroup>SAVNET</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 49?>

<t>This document proposes the Source Prefix Advertisement (SPA) technology for intra-domain SAVNET, called SPA-based SAVNET. SPA-based SAVNET allows routers in an intra-domain network to exchange SAV-specific information through SPA messages. Compared with existing intra-domain SAV mechanisms <xref target="RFC3704">RFC2827</xref>, SPA-based SAVNET can generate more accurate and robust SAV rules on intra-domain routers in an automatic way. This document introduces the content of SPA messages and the process of generating SAV rules. SPA messages can be transmitted by a new protocol or an extension to an existing protocol. Protocol designs and extensions are not in the scope of this document.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 53?>

<section anchor="sec-intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The main purpose of the intra-domain SAV for an AS A, is to block spoofing data packets from a host network or a customer network that use source addresses of other networks, as well as block spoofing data packets from other ASes that use source addresses of AS A (see <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement"/>). However, existing intra-domain SAV solutions (e.g., BCP38 <xref target="RFC2827"/> and BCP84 <xref target="RFC3704"/>) have problems of high operational overhead or inaccurate validation. Specifically, ACL-based ingress filtering (BCP38 <xref target="RFC2827"/>) requires manual operations to configure and update SAV rules, and strict uRPF (BCP84 <xref target="RFC3704"/>) may improperly block legitimate data packets in the scenario of routing asymmetry. To improve the accuracy upon existing intra-domain SAV mechanisms and enable automatic update, intra-domain SAVNET architecture requires SAVNET routers to automatically generate SAV rules by using SAV-specific information <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture"/>.</t>
      <t>This document proposes the Source Prefix Advertisement (SPA) technology for intra-domain SAVNET, called SPA-based SAVNET. Following the intra-domain SAVNET architecture, SPA-based SAVNET allows SAVNET routers in an intra-domain network to signal SAV-specific information through SPA messages. By using SAV-specific information, SAVNET routers can generate more accurate and robust SAV rules in an automatic way. This document introduces the content of SPA messages and the process of generating SAV rules. SPA messages can be transmitted by a new protocol or an extension to an existing protocol. Protocol designs and extensions are not in the scope of this document.</t>
      <t>The reader is encouraged to be familiar with <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>SAV Rule: The rule that describes the mapping relationship between a source address (prefix) and its valid incoming router interface(s).</t>
        <t>SAVNET Router: An intra-domain router that deploys SPA-based SAVNET.</t>
        <t>Host-facing Router: An intra-domain router facing an intra-domain host network.</t>
        <t>Customer-facing Router: An intra-domain router facing an intra-domain customer network.</t>
        <t>Single-homed Stub Network: A stub network that is belonging to or connected to only one AS.</t>
        <t>Multi-homed Stub Network: A stub network that is belonging to or connected to multiple ASes.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview-of-spa-based-savnet">
      <name>Overview of SPA-based SAVNET</name>
      <t>SPA-based SAVNET requires SAVNET routers to signal SAV-specific information through SPA message communication. The SAV-specific information contains the necessary information that improves the accuracy of SAV rules and cannot be learned from existing routing information. By using SAV-specific information, SAVNET routers can generate allowlist SAV rules (i.e., "Interface-based prefix allowlist" mode in <xref target="I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table"/>) or blocklist SAV rules (i.e., "Interface-based prefix blocklist" mode in <xref target="I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table"/>) on specific router interfaces.</t>
      <t>The SAVNET router can be an intra-domain router facing a stub network (e.g., a host network and a customer network) or facing an external AS. Specifically, to block spoofing data packets from a host network or a customer network that use source addresses of other networks, SPA-based SAVNET can generate an allowlist on interfaces facing a host network or a customer network. The allowlist contains source prefixes of the corresponding network, because data packets from the network can only use source addresses belonging to the network unless there is a special case such as Direct Server Return (DSR). To block spoofing data packets from other ASes that use source addresses of the local AS, SPA-based SAVNET can generate a blocklist on interfaces facing an external AS, containing source prefixes of the local AS.</t>
      <t>In the following, <xref target="sec-SPA"/> introduces content of the SPA message and procedure of SAV rule generation. <xref target="sec-usecases"/> introduces the most recommended use case, an alternative use case, and two corner use cases of SPA-based SAVNET, respectively.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-SPA">
      <name>Source Prefix Advertisement Procedure</name>
      <t>Source Prefix Advertisement (SPA) procedure includes three main steps: SPA message generation, SPA message communication, and SAV rule generation.</t>
      <section anchor="spa-message-generation">
        <name>SPA Message Generation</name>
        <t>A SPA message contains two main types of information:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Source Prefix: This information contains source prefixes learned from the router's local routes to its stub network, i.e., the locally-known source prefixes of the stub network. Specifically, each Dest Prefix in RIB that has an outgoing interface towards the stub network will be considered as a source prefix of the stub network. Note that in the case of asymmetric routes, the locally-known source prefixes may be only a part of all source prefixes of the stub network.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Stub Network Identifier: For each source prefix contained in the SPA message, it is binded with a Stub Network Identifier (SNI). The SNI is used to identify which stub network owns the source prefix. Prefixes belonging to the same stub network <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have an identical and unique SNI value. Different stub networks <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have different SNI values. The SNI is the key SAV-specific information used by SPA-based SAVNET when generating allowlists or blocklists.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Source prefixes contained in a SPA message indicate source addresses that can only be used by data packets received from the stub network. Therefore, only SAVNET routers facing a single-homed stub network (but there can be multiple links between the intra-domain network and the stub network) will generate SPA messages.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="spa-message-communication">
        <name>SPA Message Communication</name>
        <t>After generating SPA messages, the SAVNET router will provide its SPA messages to other SAVNET routers in the same intra-domain network. <xref target="fig-SPA-Communication"/> shows an example of SPA message communication. Routers A and B are host-facing routers facing the same single-homed stub network. Router C is an AS border router (ASBR) facing an external AS. Routers A and B can automatically exchange their SPA messages to ensure that they learn the full source prefixes of the stub network, even if there is an asymmetric route. Router A or B can automatically provide its SPA message to Router C, informing Router C which source addresses cannot be used by data packets from an external AS.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-SPA-Communication">
          <name>An example of SPA message communication</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
              +------------+              
              | Other ASes |             
              +-----+------+              
                    |                     
+-------------------|--------------------+
|              +----+-----+           AS |
|              | Router C |              |
|              +----------+              |
|              /\        /\              |
|              /          \              |
| SPA message /            \ SPA message |
| of Router A/              \of Router B |
|           /   SPA message  \           |
|          /    of Router A   \          |
|  +----------+ --------->  +----------+ |
|  | Router A |             | Router B | |
|  +------+---+ <---------  +--+-------+ |
|          \    SPA message   /          |
|           \   of Router B  /           |
|            \              /            |
|            +--------------+            |
|            | Stub Network |            |
|            +--------------+            |
+----------------------------------------+       
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>Implementation consideration: Since the SPA message contains source prefixes of a stub network, SPA message communication can be implemented by using existing intra-domain routing protocols (e.g., OSPF, IS-IS, iBGP). When distributing the IP information of the stub network through the intra-domain routing protocol, the SAVNET router can bind the SNI with the IP information. This document focuses on the protocol-independent design of SPA-based SAVNET. Protocol designs and extensions are not in the scope of this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-rule">
        <name>SAV Rule Generation</name>
        <t>After receiving SPA messages from other SAVNET router, each SAVNET router will generate allowlists or blocklists on specific interfaces:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Allowlist generation procedure: A SAVNET router facing a stub network can generate an allowlist on the corresponding interface by using its own SPA message as well as SPA messages of other SAVNET routers (if any) facing the same stub network. All source prefixes in SPA messages with the SNI of its stub network will be added into the allowlist. The stub network can be a host network, a customer network, a stub OSPF area, or a stub AS. When using an allowlist on an interface facing a stub network, it must ensure that the stub network is not multi-homed to another AS.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Blocklist generation procedure: A SAVNET router can generate a blocklist by using SPA messages from other SAVNET routers. All source prefixes in SPA messages will be added into the blocklist. The blocklist is recommended to be used on interfaces facing an external AS or facing a stub network that is multi-homed to multiple ASes.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-usecases">
      <name>Use Case</name>
      <section anchor="the-most-recommended-use-case">
        <name>The Most Recommended Use Case</name>
        <t>SPA-based SAVNET is highly recommended to be deployed at host-facing routers, customer-facing routers, and AS border routers. It is because that these routers are closer to the source and thus will be more effective in identifying and discarding source-spoofed data packets. SPA-based SAVNET generates allowlists on interfaces facing a host network, a customer network, or a stub AS, and generates blocklists on interfaces facing a non-stub AS.</t>
        <t><xref target="fig-use-case1"/> shows an example of the most recommended use case. SPA-based SAVNET is deployed at Routers A, B, and C. The stub network 1 or 2 can be a host network, a customer network, or a stub AS. Stub network 1 is single-homed to the intra-domain network but multi-connected to Routers A and B. Stub network 1 is single-homed to the intra-domain network and single-connected to Router B. Router C is connected to an external non-stub AS. Stub network 1 has two source prefixes P1 and P2. Due to traffic engineering and load balance, Router A only learns the route to prefix P1 from its Interface '#' and Router B only learns the route to prefix P2 from its Interface '#'. The SNI value of stub network 1 is set as 1, and the SNI value of stub network 2 is set as 2.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-use-case1">
          <name>An example of the most recommended use case of SPA-based SAVNET</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
                      +---------------+                                                  
                      | Non-stub ASes |                                                  
                      +---------------+                                                  
                             |                                                         
+----------------------------|------------------------------+                          
|                       +----#-----+                        |                          
|                       | Router C |                        |                          
|                       +----------+                        |                          
|                            ^                              |                          
|                SPA message | SPA message                  |                          
|                of Router A | of Router B                  |                          
|                            |                              |                          
|          +-----------------+-----------------+            |                          
|          |    Other intra-domain routers     |            |                          
|          +---+----------------------------+--+            |                          
|            ^ |                            | ^             |                          
|SPA message | | SPA message    SPA message | | SPA message |                          
|of Router A | | of Router B    of Router A | | of Router B |                          
|            | v                            v |             |                          
|           +----------+             +----------+           |                          
|           | Router A |             | Router B |           |                          
|           +------#---+             +--#---X---+           |                          
|                   \                  /     \              |                          
|                    \                /       \             |                          
|                     \              /         \            |                          
|                    +----------------+   +----------------+|                          
|                    | Stub Network 1 |   | Stub Network 2 ||                          
|                    +----------------+   +----------------+|                          
|                    (Source prefixes:    (Source prefixes: |                          
|                     P1 and P2)           P3)              |                          
+-----------------------------------------------------------+                          

SPA message of Router A: 
[Source Prefix: P1, SNI: 1]

SPA message of Router B: 
{[Source Prefix: P2, SNI: 1], [Source Prefix: P3, SNI: 2]}                           
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>Router A generates a SPA message containing source prefix P1 with a SNI value of 1. Router B generates a SPA message containing source prefix P2 with a SNI value of 1, and source prefix P3 with a SNI value of 1. After that, Router A or Router B provides its SPA message to other SAVNET routers. Router A or Router B finally generates an allowlist on its Interface '#' containing source prefixes P1 and P2, because both source prefixes have the SNI value of stub network 1. In addition, Router B generates an allowlist on its Interface 'X' containing source prefix P3 because only prefix P3 has the SNI value of stub network 2. Router C finally generates a blocklist on its Interface '#' containing all source prefixes of all SPA messages, i.e., prefixes P1, P2, and P3.</t>
        <t>By using the allowlist or blocklist on different router interfaces, the intra-domain network can effectively prevent spoofing data packets from entering the intra-domain network while avoiding improper blocks. Routers A and B will only allow data packets from stub network 1 with source addresses in prefixes P1 and P2. Router B will only allow data packets from stub network 2 with source addresses in prefix P3. Router C will block data packets from external ASes with source addresses in prefixes P1, P2, and P3.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="an-alternative-use-case">
        <name>An Alternative Use Case</name>
        <t>SPA-based SAVNET can also be used on Area Border Routers (ABR) in inter-area cases. For example, if the stub network in <xref target="fig-use-case1"/> is a stub OSPF area, SPA-based SAVNET can also generate an allowlist on interfaces facing the stub OSPF area and thus only allow data packets using source addresses belonging to the stub OSPF area. However, it is less effective than deploying SPA-based SAVNET on interfaces facing a host network, a customer network, or a stub AS, because allowlists on ABRs are coarser. As a result, deploying SPA-based SAVNET on ABRs is an alternative rather than the most recommended use case.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="two-corner-use-cases">
        <name>Two Corner Use Cases</name>
        <section anchor="direct-server-return-dsr">
          <name>Direct Server Return (DSR)</name>
          <t>In the case of DSR, the content server in a stub network will send data packets using source addresses of the anycast server in another AS (see <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement"/>). To avoid blocking these special data packets, these specially used source addresses should be added into allowlists on interfaces facing a stub network where the content server locates.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="multi-homed-stub-network">
          <name>Multi-homed Stub Network</name>
          <t>As mentioned in <xref target="sec-SPA"/>, if a stub network is multi-homed to other ASes, SPA-based SAVNET must not generate SPA messages for this stub network and must not use an allowlist on the interface facing this stub network. It is because the router facing this stub network may only learns a part of source prefixes of the stub network. Therefore, it is recommended to use a blocklist in this case.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-converge">
      <name>Convergence Considerations</name>
      <t>The propagation speed of SPA messages is a key factor affecting convergence. Consider that routing information and SAV-specific information can be originated and advertised through a similar way, SAV-specific information <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> at least have a similar propagation speed as routing information. When designing SPA message communication methods, routing protocol-based methods should be preferred.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-deploy">
      <name>Incremental Deployment Considerations</name>
      <t>In the most recommended use case, SPA-based SAVNET is deployed on all host-facing routers, customer-facing routers, and AS border routers. When SPA-based SAVNET has not been deployed in all of these required routers simultaneously, SPA-based SAVNET supports incremental deployment by providing incremental benefits.</t>
      <t>For allowlist generation, if the SAVNET router faces a stub network with only one link to the intra-domain network, it can generate an accurate allowlist on the corresponding interface without SPA messages of other routers. If the SAVNET router faces a stub network with multiple links to the intra-domain network, it only needs SPA messages of other routers facing the same stub network to generate a complete allowlist.</t>
      <t>For blocklist generation, if the SAVNET router only learns partial internal prefixes, the generated blocklist can still be used to prevent spoofing data packets using source addresses in these prefixes from entering the intra-domain network.</t>
      <t>As a result, when SPA-based SAVNET is partially deployed on the required routers, it can still block spoofing data packets on SAVNET routers.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The security considerations described in <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture"/> also applies to this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-06" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Source Address Validation in Intra-domain Networks Gap Analysis, Problem Statement, and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jianping Wu" initials="J." surname="Wu">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Lancheng Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mingqing(Michael) Huang" initials="M." surname="Huang">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="12" month="September" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document provides the gap analysis of existing intra-domain source address validation mechanisms, describes the fundamental problems, and defines the requirements for technical improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-problem-statement-06"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture-01" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Intra-domain Source Address Validation (SAVNET) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Jianping Wu" initials="J." surname="Wu">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Lancheng Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Li Chen" initials="L." surname="Chen">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="14" month="October" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes the intra-domain SAVNET architecture, which achieves accurate source address validation (SAV) in an intra-domain network by an automatic way. Compared with uRPF-like SAV mechanisms [RFC3704] that only depend on routers' local routing information, SAVNET routers generate SAV rules by using both local routing information and SAV-specific information exchanged among routers, resulting in more accurate SAV validation in asymmetric routing scenarios. Compared with ACL-based ingress filtering [RFC2827] that entirely requires manual efforts to accommodate to network dynamics, SAVNET routers learn SAV rules automatically in a distributed way.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-savnet-intra-domain-architecture-01"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2827" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2827.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing</title>
            <author fullname="P. Ferguson" initials="P." surname="Ferguson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Senie" initials="D." surname="Senie"/>
            <date month="May" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This paper discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to prohibit DoS (Denial of Service) attacks which use forged IP addresses to be propagated from 'behind' an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) aggregation point. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="38"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2827"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2827"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3704" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3704" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3704.xml">
          <front>
            <title>Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks</title>
            <author fullname="F. Baker" initials="F." surname="Baker"/>
            <author fullname="P. Savola" initials="P." surname="Savola"/>
            <date month="March" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>BCP 38, RFC 2827, is designed to limit the impact of distributed denial of service attacks, by denying traffic with spoofed addresses access to the network, and to help ensure that traffic is traceable to its correct source network. As a side effect of protecting the Internet against such attacks, the network implementing the solution also protects itself from this and other attacks, such as spoofed management access to networking equipment. There are cases when this may create problems, e.g., with multihoming. This document describes the current ingress filtering operational mechanisms, examines generic issues related to ingress filtering, and delves into the effects on multihoming in particular. This memo updates RFC 2827. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="84"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3704"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3704"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huang-savnet-sav-table-07" xml:base="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.huang-savnet-sav-table.xml">
          <front>
            <title>General Source Address Validation Capabilities</title>
            <author fullname="Mingqing(Michael) Huang" initials="M." surname="Huang">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Weiqiang Cheng" initials="W." surname="Cheng">
              <organization>China Mobile</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Nan Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mingxing Liu" initials="" surname="Liu">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Li Chen" initials="L." surname="Chen">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Changwang Lin" initials="C." surname="Lin">
              <organization>New H3C Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="25" month="August" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The SAV rules of existing source address validation (SAV) mechanisms, are derived from other core data structures, e.g., FIB-based uRPF, which are not dedicatedly designed for source filtering. Therefore there are some limitations related to deployable scenarios and traffic handling policies. To overcome these limitations, this document introduces the general SAV capabilities from data plane perspective. How to implement the capabilities and how to generate SAV rules are not in the scope of this document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-huang-savnet-sav-table-07"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 252?>



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